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TAX COMMENT
CONSTRUCTIVE RECEIPT OF DIVIDENDS.-The legal battle is still
raging as to the time for reporting dividends declared at the close of
one year, checks for which were not actually received by stockholders
reporting on cash receipts and disbursements basis until ihe follow-
ing year.
In the matter of Shearman v. Commissioner:' the petitioner, by
resolution of the board of directors of a corporation, became entitled
to dividends on her stock, payable on December 31, 1928. Dividend
checks were mailed on December 31, but were not actually received
by her until January 2, 1929, on which day the checks were credited
to her account in her bank and were paid in due course. She did not
include these dividends in her return for 1928. The Court, in passing
upon the perennial problem, has in affirming the decision of the
B. T. A. stated in substance that dividends so declared are taxable
and are to be included in the return for the year in which the tax-
payer is entitled to receive the dividends as fixed by the resolution of
the board of directors. We believe the principles of the conclusions
reached by the Court to be sound; but the statement of the facts and
the application of the law, we think, were not carefully analyzed by
the Court. In arriving at the above conclusion, the Court based its
decision upon the provisions of the statute and regulations 2 that such
dividends as these should be included in gross income by the dis-
tributees 3 "as of the date when the cash or other property is unquali-
fiedly made subject to their demands." Mr. Justice Chase, writing
for the court, states,4 "in deciding whether Congress meant after the
1924 act: that only dividends actually received were to be included in
any taxable period or whether it was intended that the theory of
constructive receipt was thereafter to prevail, the retention in sub-
sequent acts without material change of the provisions construed by
the administrative department to mean constructive receipt, persua-
sively indicates that Congress approved the interpretation * * *." 5 In
support of its holding, the Court cites the case of Bingham v. Com-
nissioner 6 as presenting an analogous situation. The holding in the
Bingham case we believe to have been not well considered by the
Court, for the two cases do not present a similar statement of fact.
166 F. (2d) 256 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
'REVENUe AcT OF 1924 (26 U. S. C. A. §954); REvENuE ACT OF 1926
(26 U. S. C. A. §954); REVENuE AcT OF 1928 (26 U. S. C. A. §2042).
'Supra note 1, at 257.
Ibid. at 257.
'Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327, 50 Sup. Ct. 115, 74 L. ed. 457 (1930);
Burnet v. Thompson Oil and Gas Co., 283 U. S. 301, 307, 308, 51 Sup. Ct. 418,
75 L. ed. 1049 (1931) ; Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287 U. S. 299, 307, 53 Sup.
Ct. 161, 77 L. ed. 318 (1932); Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378, 392, 393,
53 Sup. Ct. 457, 77 L. ed. 844 (1933); United States v. Dakota-Montana Oil
Co., 288 U. S. 459, 466, 53 Sup. Ct. 435, 77 L. ed. 893 (1933).
835 F. (2d) 503 (1929).
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In the Matter of Bingham7 the fact was first established that the
taxpayer, on the day the dividend was declared,8 " * * * could have
gotten his money if he had wanted it * * *." There appears to be no
such findings in the Shearman case.9 It is true that the B. T. A., in
its opinion (not finding of fact) of the Shearman case, did state 10
"that the petitioner could have made a personal demand for, and
received, her dividend payments from the corporation at the close of
business on December 31, 1928. However, the Appellate Court
record does not disclose that the checks were "good." Obviously,
the Court did not base its decision on this all-important fact. In the
absence of a reference to such fact, the decision is not intelligible.
In the matter of Tod v. Commissioner," in which the same situation
was involved, the Board, after first having found that 1 2 "on Decem-
ber 31st, the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company had funds avail-
able for the payment of said dividends * * *," decided similarly. In
a recent decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, The Hamilton
National Bank of Chattanooga, etc. v. Commissioner,13 wherein A
sold a franchise to B and tendered his note due on or before July,
1930, in payment, B thereupon attempted a resale at a profit to C,
who refused to accept until B's indebtedness to A was cancelled. A
refused to accept prepayment of the note he held. B, in order to
consummate the sale to C, deposited the amount in a savings bank in
his own name as trustee, and delivered to the bank the pass book and
check for the full amount, drawn to the order of A, with instructions
to deliver the check and pass book to A in January, 1930. The Court,
applying the principle of constructive receipt, held the amount tax-
able for the year 1929, here again stating: 14 "thus it seems clear
that had he [A] changed his mind at any time during the latter part
of 1929 and asked for the cash, he could have had it." We find that
a taxpayer may not deliberately turn his back upon income and thus
select the year for which he will report it. Apparently in every case
decided in favor of the principle of constructive receipt, the fact that
the funds are immediately available presents the basis for the decision.
Yet the Shearman case 15 bears no indication of having been decided
on that point. In the matter of Braunstein v. Commissioner,' divi-
dends were similarly declared on December 26, 1923, check was
'Apparently the Supreme Court has never decisively passed upon this
question, as the petition for a writ of certiorari in the Bingham case was denied
(281 U. S. 729), and we can find no other instance in which the Supreme Court
has specifically passed upon the problem.8Supra note 6, at 504.
'Supra note 1.
"26 B. T. A. 716, 719 (1932).
"19 B. T. A. 1027 (1930).
Id. at 1028.
"29 B. T. A. 16 (1933).
"Supra note 13.
'Supra note 1.1616 B. T. A. 1330 (1929).
TAX COMMENT
mailed December 31, 1923, and was not received until January,
1924. The Court found,1 7 "the corporation did not have sufficient
funds in its general checking account to pay the dividends on Decem-
ber 31, 1923" and because of that fact held that the dividend was
income to petitioner in 1924.
In the Shearman case,'8 the Court attempts to reconcile its
decision therein rendered with the decision in the case of Confmis-
sioner v. Adams.'9 In the Adams case, a resolution declared a divi-
dend payable by checks, to be mailed on December 31st, on which day
funds were available. The checks were received the following year
and the income was held to be taxable in the following year. The
Court, in its labored attempt to distinguish the Shearman case from
the Adams case, declared, 20 "perhaps that case [Adams case] differs
from this [Shearman case] in that the taxpayer was there entitled to
receive the dividends only at such time as checks mailed were deliv-
ered." (In the Shearman case) "the time in which the taxpayer was
entitled to receive the dividends was definitely fixed by resolution
to be within the preceding year." This appears to be a futile attempt
to distinguish the facts in two cases, between which we can find no
difference. The Court, in the light of the Bingham decision,2 1 should
have regarded the holding of the Adams case as being erroneous,
instead of drawing a distinction without a difference. It would seem
that the decision in the Shearnman case is sound, but the analysis of
the precedents and the theory underlying the decision apparently was
not clearly understood by the Court.
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FEDERAL TAXATION OF STATE INSTRUMENTALITIES-CoNSTITU-
TIONAL LAw.-The University of Illinois, an institution of higher
learninj maintained by the state of Illinois, imported certain labora-
tory equipment. Duties were levied under the appropriate paragraph
of the Tariff Act of 1922 and were paid under protest. The univer-
sity brought suit to recover them, claiming that, as an instrumentality
of the state government, it was exempt from federal taxation. On
appeal from decisions 1 affirming the action of the collector, held,
affirmed. Customs duties may be levied under the power of Congress
to regulate foreign commerce, and the fact that they are incidentally
taxes will not render the levy invalid. Board of Trustees of tle
17 Id. at 1331.
Supra note 1.
"54 F. (2d) 228 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931).
'Supra note 1, at 258.
' Supra note 6.
'59 TREAS. DEC. 747 (1931); 61 TREAS. DEC. 1334 (1932).
